Pekakak adalah salah satu tokoh yang memiliki pengetahuan mendalam dan perencanaan yang cermat. Saat fajar menyingsing, ia terlihat bertengger di atas pohon. Dengan kemampuan sempurna untuk mengontrol kecepatan penerbangan miliknya, seperti kapan harus memperlambat atau mempercepat, dia dapat dengan mudah menghitung cara optimal untuk menangkap ikan.

Many differences exist between the logical relations “equality” and “equivalence”. In this monograph I point out differences that concern definition, linguistics, computational gates and tables, denotation, application, negation of terms, negation of the relation, relations to other relations, the laws of symmetry, transitivity and reflexivity, the laws of commutation and permutation, the law of tautology, the law of distribution, the law of association, propositional meaning, and “genesis”. I also point out a form of “symmetry breaking”: the negation of some equality (...) may yield some non-equality, while the negation of that non-equality might not yield the same equality. (For full access: use the website link of the title page. -- Copyright License: CC BY-NC-ND. -- DOI: 10.17026/dans-zh3-h2b2 --). (shrink)

Le XI.ème Congrès International de Philosophie Médiévale de la Société Internationale pour l’Étude de la Philosophie Médiévale (S.I.E.P.M..) s’est déroulé à Porto (Portugal), du 26 au 30 août 2002, sous le thème général: Intellect et Imagination dans la Philosophie Médiévale. A partir des héritages platonicien, aristotélicien, stoïcien, ou néo-platonicien (dans leurs variantes grecques, latines, arabes, juives), la conceptualisation et la problématisation de l’imagination et de l’intellect, ou même des facultés de l’âme en général, apparaissaient comme une ouverture possible pour aborder (...) les principaux points de la pensée médiévale. Les Actes du congrès montrent que « imagination » et « intellect » sont porteurs d’une richesse philosophique extraordinaire dans l’économie de la philosophie médiévale et de la constitution de ses spécificités historiques. Dans sa signification la plus large, la théorisation de ces deux facultés de l’âme permet de dédoubler le débat en au moins six grands domaines: — la relation avec le sensible, où la fantaisie/l’imagination joue le rôle de médiation dans la perception du monde et dans la constitution de la connaissance ; — la réflexion sur l’acte de connaître et la découverte de soi en tant que sujet de pensée ; — la position dans la nature, dans le cosmos, et dans le temps de celui qui pense et qui connaît par les sens externes, internes et par l’intellect ; — la recherche d’un fondement pour la connaissance et l’action, par la possibilité du dépassement de la distante proximité du transcendant, de l’absolu, de la vérité et du bien ; — la réalisation de la félicité en tant qu’objectif ultime, de même que la découverte d’une tendance au dépassement actif ou mystique de toutes les limites naturelles et des facultés de l’âme ; — la constitution de théories de l’image, sensible ou intellectuelle, et de ses fonctions. Les 3 volumes d’Actes incluent les 16 leçons plénières et 112 communications, ainsi que les index correspondants (manuscrits ; noms anciens et médiévaux ; noms modernes ; auteurs). Le volume IV des Actes, contenant 39 communications et des index, est publié par la revue " Mediaevalia. Textos e Estudos ", du Gabinete de Filosofia Medieval de l’Universidade do Porto (volume 23, de 2004). Ouvrage publié avec l’appui de l’Universidade do Porto, de la Faculdade de Letras da U.P., du Departamento de Filosofia - F.L.U.P. et de la Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (Portugal). (shrink)

This article aims to read feminist new materialisms (Barad), together with ‘postulated’ linguistic or cultural primacy of Queer Theory (Butler), to show how both are engaged in similar critical-ethical endeavours. The central argument is that the criticism of Barad and new materialisms misses Butler’s materialistic insights due to a narrow interpretation of Butler's alleged social-constructivist position. There is, therefore, a specific focus on where they both make similar ethical appeals. Moreover, the article relies on Adorno's negative dialectic to highlight an (...) interpretation of Barad and Butler as being part of the same dialectical movement, in which materialism and idealism fluctuate in their mutual criticisms, thus continuing the procession towards 'new knowledge' and emancipation, or freedom, through their motions back and forth. (shrink)

Most contemporary philosophers of action accept Aristotle’s view that actions involve movements generated by an internal cause. This is reflected in the wide support enjoyed by the Causal Theory of Action (CTA), according to which actions are bodily movements caused by mental states. Some critics argue that CTA suffers from the Problem of Disappearing Agents (PDA), the complaint that CTA excludes agents because it reduces them to mere passive arenas in which certain events and processes take place. Extant treatments of (...) PDA, most notably those of Michael Bratman and David Velleman, interpret the problem as a challenge to CTA’s ability to capture the role of rational capacities like deliberation and reflection in the etiology of human action. I argue that PDA admits of another interpretation, one that arises when we appreciate that the exercise of higher rational capacities in action presupposes possession of a prior lower-level capacity for basic self-movement – the power to initiate and control one’s bodily behavior. Bolstering CTA so that it accommodates richer exercises of practical thought – as Bratman and Velleman do – will not resolve PDA unless CTA already captures this basic agential power. Adequately responding to PDA, therefore, requires answering a question unaddressed by current responses: How do bodily movements caused by sub-agential items like mental states count as movements actively performed by the whole agent? I argue that CTA can answer this question by adopting a normative account of the nature of self-moving agents. On this view, self-moving agents are teleologically constituted, meaning (1) their nature and proper function derives from their characteristic ends and aims, and (2) the nature and proper function of their parts depend on these ends and aims. Basic self-movement consists of movements caused by a sub-agential part whose own proper function is to generate behavior that constitutes or contributes to the pursuit of the agent’s overall proper function. After showing how this picture applies to artifactual and collective agents (i.e., robots and teams), I extend the account to organic agents (human beings) by sketching a broadly Aristotelian picture of the nature of living things. (shrink)

In this chapter we focus on the debate over publicly-maintained racist monuments as it manifests in the mid-2010s Anglosphere, primarily in the US (chiefly regarding the over 700 monuments devoted to the Confederacy), but to some degree also in Britain and Commonwealth countries, especially South Africa (chiefly regarding monuments devoted to figures and events associated with colonialism and apartheid). After pointing to some representative examples of racist monuments, we discuss ways a monument can be thought racist, and neutrally categorize removalist (...) and preservationist arguments heard in the monument debate. We suggest that both extremist and moderate removalist goals are likely to be self-defeating, and that when concerns of civic sustainability are put on moral par with those of fairness and justice, something like a Mandela-era preservationist policy is best: one which removes the most offensive of the minor racist monuments, but which focuses on closing the monumentary gap between peoples and reframing existing racist monuments. (shrink)

Her din ve mistik kültürde ortaya çıkan dinî tecrübelerin felsefe, kelam ve fıkıh gibi bilim alanlarında farklı açıklamaları yapılmış, akli olup olmadığı sorgulanmıştır. Vahiy, keramet, vecd, hulul, tecelli gibi kavramlara açıklamalar getirilmiştir. Fakat bu tür tecrübelerin insanın fizyolojik ve psikolojik mekanizmalarıyla ne tür bir bağlantısı olduğu İslam düşünce geleneğinde pek tartışılmamıştır. Bu tür tecrübe yaşayan kişilerin sorunlu olup olmadığı tıbbi açıdan değerlendirilmemiştir. Dini tecrübeleri tıbbî bir sorun olarak ele alıp bu tecrübeleri ‘deney’ konusu yaparak inceleyen ilk düşünür William James’tir (ö.1910). (...) O, The Varieties of Religious Experience adlı kitabında her türlü ‘dini’ olarak ifade edilen tecrübeleri ele alıp açıkladığı gibi, dini olmayan ama dini tecrübelere benzer mistik tecrübeleri de araştırıp, incelemiştir. Fakat James, araştırmasında dini ve mistik tecrübe ayırımı yapmamıştır. İkili bir ayırma tabi tutulmadan bütün tecrübelerin tek bir başlık altında incelenip ‘psikolojik durum’ olarak kabul edilmesi bu bildirinin ele aldığı ana sorundur. Bütün tecrübeler tek bir başlık altında ele alınırsa peygamberlerin tecrübeleri (vahiy) ile bunun dışında yer alan mistik tecrübelerin (vecd, keramet) bir farkı kalmayacaktır. Bu ikisini ayırmak için akli kriterleri ve tecrübelerinin ana iddialarını değerlendirip ele almak gerekir. Vahiy tecrübelerinin temel iddialarıyla mistik tecrübelerin iddialarını karşılaştırdığımızda vahiy tecrübelerinin akli kriterlere uygun olduğu ve tıbbi açıdan hastalıklı bir insanın tecrübesi olmadığı görülecektir. Mistik tecrübeler de ise durum bunun tersi görünmektedir. Mistik tecrübeler geçirenlerin çoğu zaman depresyon, manik ve çoğu zaman da uyuşturucu ile ortaya çıktığı, bunalımlı ve savaş dönemlerinde bu tür tecrübelerin arttığı görülür. Bu şekilde vahiy tecrübesinin doğruluğu ortaya konduğunda toplumu etkileyen dini inançların doğru kaynağına yönelmek mümkün olur. Mistik tecrübelerin ise hastalıklı zihnin ürünü olması nedeniyle insanları saptırıcı, dinden çıkarıcı ve akıl dışı olduğu ortaya çıkar. Bu şekilde dini inançların istikameti doğru bir şekilde çizilmiş olur. (shrink)

Given the close relatedness of local issues, water scarcity, and sustainability, this research sought to investigate the factors affecting residents’ willingness to reuse direct and indirect potable water in the arid region. Utilizing the Bayesian Mindsponge Framework (BMF), an analysis was undertaken with a sample of 1,831 water consumers in the City of Albuquerque, the most populous city in New Mexico, United States. The primary analysis revealed positive associations between local concerns about drought or water scarcity and population growth with (...) residents' willingness to reuse direct and indirect potable water. Conversely, concerns about water quality and water bills were found to be negatively associated with the willingness to utilize directly and indirectly recycled water for drinking. In light of these findings, the study explores the potential of fostering an eco-surplus culture by cultivating a sense of environmental responsibility and acknowledging the relationship between local issues and environmental conditions. Simultaneously, the study proposes collaboration between the government and residents to promote water reuse programs to conserve water resources effectively. (shrink)

Saya telah membaca banyak diskusi baru-baru ini batas komputasi dan alam semesta sebagai komputer, berharap untuk menemukan beberapa komentar pada karya menakjubkan fisikawan polimatematika dan teori keputusan David Wolpert tetapi belum menemukan satu rujukan dan jadi aku menyajikan ringkasan ini sangat singkat. Wolpert terbukti beberapa impotensi yang menakjubkan atau teorema ketidaklengkapan (1992 untuk 2008-Lihat arxiv dot org) pada batas untuk kesimpulan (perhitungan) yang begitu umum mereka independen dari perangkat melakukan komputasi, dan bahkan independen dari hukum fisika, sehingga mereka berlaku di (...) seluruh komputer, fisika, dan perilaku manusia. Mereka memanfaatkan diagonalisasi Cantor, paradoks liar dan worldlines untuk memberikan apa yang mungkin menjadi teorema utama dalam teori mesin Turing, dan tampaknya memberikan wawasan ketidakmungkinan, ketidaklengkapan, batas komputasi, dan alam semesta sebagai komputer, di semua semesta yang mungkin dan semua makhluk atau mekanisme, menghasilkan, antara lain, non-kuantum prinsip ketidakpastian mekanik dan bukti monoteisme. Ada hubungan yang jelas dengan karya klasik Chaitin, Solomonoff, Komolgarov dan Wittgenstein dan dengan anggapan bahwa tidak ada program (dan dengan demikian tidak ada perangkat) dapat menghasilkan urutan (atau perangkat) dengan kompleksitas yang lebih besar daripada memiliki. Orang mungkin mengatakan bahwa tubuh kerja menyiratkan ateisme karena tidak dapat ada entitas yang lebih kompleks daripada alam semesta fisik dan dari sudut pandang Wittgensteinian, ' lebih kompleks ' tidak berarti (tidak memiliki kondisi kepuasan, yaitu, pembuat kebenaran atau tes). Bahkan ' Allah ' (yaitu, sebuah ' device'dengan waktu tak terbatas/ruang dan energi) tidak dapat menentukan apakah yang diberikan ' nomor ' adalah ' acak ', atau menemukan cara tertentu untuk menunjukkan bahwa diberikan ' formula ', ' teorema ' atau ' kalimat ' atau ' perangkat ' (semua ini menjadi permainan bahasa yang kompleks) adalah bagian dari ' sistem ' tertentu. Mereka yang ingin komprehensif up to date kerangka perilaku manusia dari dua systems tampilan modern dapat berkonsultasi buku saya 'struktur Logis filsafat, psikologi, mind dan bahasa dalam Ludwig wittgenstein dan John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Mereka yang tertarik pada tulisan saya lebih mungkin melihat 'berbicara monyet--filsafat, psikologi, ilmu, agama dan politik di planet yang ditakdirkan--artikel dan ulasan 2006-2019 2nd Ed (2019) dan bunuh diri utopian delusi di 21st Century 4th Ed (2019). (shrink)

The alleged for-me-ness or mineness of conscious experience has been the topic of considerable debate in recent phenomenology and philosophy of mind. By considering a series of objections to the notion of for-me-ness, or to a properly robust construal of it, this paper attempts to clarify to what the notion is committed and to what it is not committed. This exercise results in the emergence of a relatively determinate and textured portrayal of for-me-ness as the authors conceive of it.

Such a bewildering and contradictory welter of behaviors and traits are connoted by “honor” and its best equivalents in other languages that analyses of the concept have daunted philosophers, anthropologists, sociologists, political scientists, historians, and literary scholars for millennia. Is it an external good given — and revoked just as easily — by others? Or does “honor” name an inner good that’s absolutely in our control: our integrity, our very commitment to right conduct? Is honor a central moral virtue — (...) as when we might say that “all was lost, save our honor”? Or is it a good quality that’s not-quite “moral,” or indeed even an antiquated virtue hostile to true morality? Is the honorable man a heroic figure who protects the weak, or one who can be expected to bully the weak, as in the case of “honor killings”? Is honor aristocratic and inegalitarian, and thus a virtue that enables and ennobles what’s essentially oppression? Or is honor a signal virtue of fair-dealing, fair-fighting, and fair competition, as evidenced in sportsmanship? (shrink)

The question of whether a proper phenomenological investigation and analysis requires one to perform the epoché and the reduction has not only been discussed within phenomenological philosophy. It is also very much a question that has been hotly debated within qualitative research. Amedeo Giorgi, in particular, has insisted that no scientific research can claim phenomenological status unless it is supported by some use of the epoché and reduction. Giorgi partially bases this claim on ideas found in Husserl’s writings on phenomenological (...) psychology. In the present paper, I discuss Husserl’s ideas and argue that while the epoché and the reduction are crucial for transcendental phenomenology, it is much more questionable whether they are also relevant for a non-philosophical application of phenomenology. (shrink)

Salah satu persoalan yang muncul dalam pendidikan di Indonesia adalah masalah kurikulum yang merupakan kebijakan pemerintah. Kurikulum yang diberlakukan di Indonesia, khususnya pada masa Orde Baru, dipandang oleh sebagian orang memiliki kepentingan politik dan terlalu sentralistik (terpusat). Melihat keadaan dan situasi pendidikan Indonesia yang demikian, ada harapan yang ditumbuhkan dengan munculnya tokoh Y.B. Mangunwijaya yang memiliki perhatian terhadap pendidikan khususnya pada anak miskin. Menurut Mangunwijaya, pola pendidikan Barat yang dibawa oleh para penjajah Belanda telah menggeser pola pendidikan tradisional Jawa yang (...) hanya menempatkan anak dalam posisi sekunder menjadi menghargai anak sebagai individu yang merdeka. Tetapi kemudian pada era Orde Baru, pemerintahan kembali mematikan kebebasan dan kreativitas anak dengan sistem pendidikan yang hanya menyuburkan kepawangan dan mental inggih ndoro pada guru dan anak-anak. Y.B. Mangunwijaya memiliki banyak konsep tentang pendidikan. Beberapa di antaranya adalah Pendidikan dan Kebudayaan Rakyat Semesta (P dan K Rata), Masyarakat Belajar (MB), Belajar Seumur Hidup (BUH), dan Kita Saling Belajar dan Mengajar, yang kesemuanya bersinggungan dengan filsafat pedagogi kritis. Kontribusi filsafat pendidikan Y.B. Mangunwijaya adalah pembangunan Sekolah Dasar Eksperimental Kanisius Mangunan yang dijalankan menggunakan konsep pemikirannya terhadap pendidikan, dibantu oleh Dinamika Edukasi Dasar (DED) sebagai bentuk pembaharuan pendidikan. (shrink)

The idea that there are some facts that call for explanation serves as an unexamined premise in influential arguments for the inexistence of moral or mathematical facts and for the existence of a god and of other universes. This book is the first to offer a comprehensive and critical treatment of this idea. It argues that calling for explanation is a sometimes-misleading figure of speech rather than a fundamental property of facts.

Hàng năm, việc công bố danh sách các nhà nghiên cứu thuộc tốp 100 ngàn các nhà nghiên cứu có trích dẫn khoa học hàng đầu thế giới theo Cơ sở dữ liệu Scopus là vấn đề rất được cộng đồng khoa học quan tâm. -/- Năm 2021, kết quả này đã tiếp tục được công bố bởi nhóm tác giả gồm TS. John P. A. Ioannidis (giáo sư thực thụ về y khoa, nghiên cứu sức khỏe và chính sách, (...) khoa học dữ liệu y sinh và thống kê học thuộc Đại học Stanford, Mỹ), Jeroen Baas (giám đốc dữ liệu của Nhà xuất bản Elsevier, Hà Lan) và TS. Kevin Boyack (giám đốc điều hành của Công ty SciTech Strategies, Mỹ; chuyên về trắc lượng khoa học). -/- Việc sử dụng Cơ sở dữ liệu Scopus thuộc Nhà xuất bản Elsevier của Hà Lan làm cho kết quả của nhóm tác giả trở nên tin cậy và có ảnh hưởng sâu rộng trong cộng đồng khoa học thế giới bởi lẽ Scopus là một trong hai cơ sở dữ liệu khoa học uy tín nhất trên thế giới hiện nay, bên cạnh Cơ sở dữ liệu Web of Science của Mỹ. -/- Trong năm nay, nhóm tác giả trên công bố các danh sách các nhà nghiên cứu có trích dẫn khoa học cao thuộc tốp 100.000 hoặc tốp 2% trên toàn thế giới gồm xét theo thành tựu trọn đời, thành tựu năm gần nhất và thành tựu theo chuyên ngành. (shrink)

A pair of C functions are defined such that D has the halting problem proof's pathological relationship to simulating termination analyzer H. When H correctly determines that D correctly simulated by H must be aborted to prevent its own infinite execution then H is necessarily correct to reject D as specifying non-halting behavior. This exact same reasoning is applied to the Peter Linz Turing machine based halting problem proof. ...

Non-skeptical robust realists about normativity, mathematics, or any other domain of non- causal truths are committed to a correlation between their beliefs and non- causal, mind-independent facts. Hartry Field and others have argued that if realists cannot explain this striking correlation, that is a strong reason to reject their theory. Some consider this argument, known as the Benacerraf–Field argument, as the strongest challenge to robust realism about mathematics, normativity, and even logic. In this article I offer two closely related accounts (...) for the type of explanation needed in order to address Field's challenge. I then argue that both accounts imply that the striking correlation to which robust realists are committed is explainable, thereby discharging Field's challenge. Finally, I respond to some objections and end with a few unresolved worries. (shrink)

Élie HALÉVY (1870-1937), philosophe et historien des idées, fut professeur à l'École libre des sciences politiques, l'ancêtre de l'actuel Sciences Po. Comme son autre grand ouvrage, l'Histoire du peuple anglais au XIXe siècle, paru en six tomes de 1913 à 1932, les trois tomes de La formation du radicalisme philosophique, parus en 1901 pour les deux premiers et en 1904 pour le troisième, reflètent pour partie ses enseignements de l'Ecole libre consacrés à l'histoire britannique. Le premier tome, La jeunesse de (...) Bentham 1776-1789, étudie la doctrine utilitariste non seulement chez celui qu'on regarde comme son fondateur principal, Jeremy Bentham, mais aussi chez les nombreux auteurs qui, en Grande-Bretagne et sur le continent, en dessinèrent avant lui les contours. Le deuxième tome, L’évolution de la doctrine utilitaire de 1789 à 1815, montre comment l'utilitarisme revêtit la forme non seulement d'une école de pensée, mais aussi d'un mouvement pour la réforme économique, sociale et politique. Le rôle coordonnateur nouveau de James Mill, ainsi qu'une convergence de vues avec les économistes, qui poussaient dans le sens des réformes, marquèrent notamment cette évolution. Le troisième tome, Le radicalisme philosophique, continue d'étudier la transformation de l'école en mouvement après la fin des guerres napoléoniennes, lorsque celle-ci commence à engranger ses premiers grands succès réformistes. Bentham, James Mill et les autres penseurs utilitaires sont alors réunis sous l'appellation de philosophic radicals. Le terme temporel de l'ouvrage est le Reform Act de 1832, première étape vers la modernisation du système électoral, que la propagande de ce groupe ne contribua pas peu à faire aboutir. Quoique l'ouvrage d'Halévy vaille en premier lieu par l'immense savoir qu'il déploie, et le nombre et l'excellence des citations qu'il propose, il comporte aussi des thèses historiques et philosophiques originales. On peut citer parmi les premières la thèse, qui relie les trois tomes, voulant que l'utilitarisme britannique trouve sa forme achevée dans l'intervention sur la société, lorsqu'il se mue en radicalisme philosophique, et parmi les secondes, la thèse, énoncée au début du premier tome, voulant qu'il existe trois modèles dominants de jonction des intérêts individuels (la fusion sympathique, l'identification naturelle et l'identification artificielle). Une autre grande thèse, à la fois historique et philosophique, affirme en substance que l'économie politique classique serait un département spécialisé de la pensée utilitaire. La question de savoir jusqu'à quel point Smith, Ricardo et Malthus ont pu adhérer au "principe d'utilité" de Bentham est toujours débattue. En même temps que les élucidations apportées à ce principe, elle contribue à expliquer l'intérêt que les historiens de la pensée économique continuent de porter à l'ouvrage. L'auteur a participé à la réédition de La formation du radicalisme philosophique en 1995 par les Presses Universitaires de France (P.U.F.), suivant un projet collectif lancé par Monique Canto-Sperber. Dans le présent article, antérieur à cette réédition, l'auteur tentait de résumer brièvement un livre qui demeure irremplaçable en dépit d'une conception et d'un style quelque peu datés. (shrink)

Philosophers of physics have long debated whether the Past State of low entropy of our universe calls for explanation. What is meant by “calls for explanation”? In this article we analyze this notion, distinguishing between several possible meanings that may be attached to it. Taking the debate around the Past State as a case study, we show how our analysis of what “calling for explanation” might mean can contribute to clarifying the debate and perhaps to settling it, thus demonstrating the (...) fruitfulness of this analysis. Applying our analysis, we show that two main opponents in this debate, Huw Price and Craig Callender, are, for the most part, talking past each other rather than disagreeing, as they employ different notions of “calling for explanation”. We then proceed to show how answering the different questions that arise out of the different meanings of “calling for explanation” can result in clarifying the problems at hand and thus, hopefully, to solving them. (shrink)

Les recherches menées dans le champ de la psychologie morale par Larry P. Nucci et Elliot Turiel conduisent à identifier le domaine moral avec le domaine des jugements prescriptifs concernant la manière dont nous devons nous comporter à l’égard des autres personnes. Ces travaux empiriques pourraient apporter du crédit aux propositions normatives du philosophe Ruwen Ogien qui défend une conception minimaliste de l’éthique. L’éthique minimale exclut en particulier le rapport à soi du domaine moral. À mon avis cependant, ces travaux (...) de psychologie morale ne permettent pas du tout d’affirmer que nous sommes, empiriquement parlant, des minimalistes moraux. Les résultats des recherches de Nucci et Turiel montrent que les personnes considèrent intuitivement que le domaine personnel – le domaine des actions qui affectent prioritairement l’agent lui-même – doit échapper au contrôle ou à l’interférence des autres personnes. Mais affirmer que c’est l’agent lui-même qui possède l’autorité légitime de décider dans le domaine personnel ne signifie pas que tout ce qu’il y fait soit moralement indifférent. (shrink)

A lineage of prominent philosophers who have discussed the second-person relation can be regarded as advancing structural accounts. They posit that the second-person relation effects one transformative change to the structure of practical reasoning. In this paper, I criticise this orthodoxy and offer an alternative, substantive account. That is, I argue that entering into second-personal relations with others does indeed affect one's practical reasoning, but it does this not by altering the structure of one's agential thought, but by changing what (...) reasons can become available. The importance of second-personal thought for action is heterogenous. Second-person relations make possible the emergence of a wide variety of different kinds of practical reasons: creating some, revealing others. Recognising this diminishes the appeal of the traditional, structural accounts of the practical significance of such second-personal relations. Moving away from structural accounts facilitates a more thorough understanding of the intersubjective form of action. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In this paper, I present data involving the use of the Romanian slur ‘țigan’, consideration of which leads to the postulation of a sui-generis, irreducible type of use of slurs. This type of use is potentially problematic for extant theories of slurs. In addition, together with other well-established uses, it shows that there is more variation in the use of slurs than previously acknowledged. I explain this variation by construing slurs as polysemous. To implement this idea, I appeal to (...) a rich-lexicon account of polysemy. I show how such a theory can be applied to slurs and discuss several important issues that arise. (shrink)

TPO - Kết quả vừa công bố ngày 10/10. Tác giả của công bố này vẫn là nhóm Metrics của giáo sư John P.A. Ioannidis và các cộng sự của Đại học Stanford của Hoa Kỳ nghiên cứu và công bố trên tạp chí PLoS Biology của Hoa Kỳ. -/- Phương pháp sắp xếp gồm: chỉ tính tác giả người Việt và sở hữu tại 1 trường ĐH Việt Nam; lọc một số tác giả trùng nhau xuất hiện nhiều lần (...) trong bảng xếp hạng, chỉ lấy vị trí cao nhất; lọc theo top 10.000 và 100.000 nhà khoa học. (shrink)

This paper is a warning that objections based on thought experiments can be misleading because they may elicit judgments that, unbeknownst to the judger, have been seriously skewed by psychological biases. The fact that most people choose not to plug in to the Experience Machine in Nozick’s (1974) famous thought experiment has long been used as a knock-down objection to hedonism because it is widely thought to show that real experiences are more important to us than pleasurable experiences. This paper (...) argues that the commonplace choice to remain in reality when offered a life in the Experience Machine is best explained by status quo bias – the irrational preference for things to remain the same. An alternative thought experiment, empirical evidence, and discussion of how psychological biases can affect our judgments are provided to support this argument. (shrink)

Pascal Engel défend explicitement le purisme (ou l’intellectualisme). Selon la version générale de cette thèse, les facteurs qui déterminent si une croyance est justifiée, ou si elle est une connaissance, ne concernent que la vérité. Ils sont totalement indépendants des désirs ou des préférences du sujet, ainsi que des conséquences pratiques potentielles du fait de posséder ces croyances. Dans son article « Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Value » (2009), P. Engel concède que des facteurs pratiques peuvent déterminer la quantité de (...) données (ou la justification) dont on a besoin pour savoir ou croire, tout en maintenant que cela n’affecte pas le purisme épistémique (dans sa version évidentialiste) sur les notions de donnée ou de degré de justification. Mais cela ne revient-il pas tout simplement à concéder l’impurisme épistémique au moins à propos de la connaissance ou de la justification simpliciter des croyances ? Dans cet article, j’examine en détails la position de P. Engel. Je montre que, correctement comprise, elle est intégralement puriste. En considérant le principe connaissance-action, je soulève néanmoins un dilemme pour son approche, jetant ainsi un doute sur le potentiel qu’elle aurait à fournir une réponse puriste satisfaisante à l’argument fondamental motivant l’impurisme épistémique. (shrink)

Are there any facts that call for explanation? According to one possible view, all facts call for explanation; according to another, none do. This paper is concerned with an intermediate view according to which some facts call for explanation and others do not. Such a view requires explaining what makes some facts call for explanation and not others. In this paper, I explore a neglected proposal, inspired by the work of George Schlesinger, according to which facts call for explanation when (...) they belong to extraordinary types. I compare the merits of this view to those of several alternatives and respond to a salient objection. I end with a discussion of how the theory fares when applied to cosmological fine-tuning arguments. (shrink)

In the recent debate about the semantics of perspectival expressions, disagreement has played a crucial role. In a nutshell, what I call “the challenge from disagreement” is the objection that certain views on the market cannot account for the intuition of disagreement present in ordinary exchanges involving perspectival expressions like “Licorice is tasty./no, it’s not.” Various contextualist answers to this challenge have been proposed, and this has led to a proliferation of notions of disagreement. It is now accepted in the (...) debate that there are many notions of disagreement and that the search for a common, basic notion is misguided. In this paper I attempt to find such a basic notion underneath this diversity. The main aim of the paper is to motivate, forge and defend a notion of “minimal disagreement” that has beneficial effects for the debate over the semantics of perspectival expressions. (shrink)

While there has been much discussion about what makes some mathematical proofs more explanatory than others, and what are mathematical coincidences, in this article I explore the distinct phenomenon of mathematical facts that call for explanation. The existence of mathematical facts that call for explanation stands in tension with virtually all existing accounts of “calling for explanation”, which imply that necessary facts cannot call for explanation. In this paper I explore what theoretical revisions are needed in order to accommodate this (...) phenomenon. One of the important upshots is that, contrary to the current consensus, low prior probability is not a necessary condition for calling for explanation. In the final section I explain how the results of this inquiry help us make progress in assessing Hartry Field’s style of reliability argument against mathematical Platonism and against robust realism in other domains of necessary facts, such as ethics. (shrink)

Call the ethos understanding rightness in terms of spiritual purity and piety, and wrongness in terms of corruption and sacrilege, the “fetish ethic.” Jonathan Haidt and his colleagues suggest that this ethos is particularly salient to political conservatives and non-liberal cultures around the globe. In this essay, I point to numerous examples of moral fetishism in mainstream academic ethics. Once we see how deeply “infected” our ethical reasoning is by fetishistic intuitions, we can respond by 1) repudiating the fetishistic impulse, (...) by 2) “sublimating” our fetishism into liberal rationales, or by 3) accepting the fetishism on its own terms. Of these options, I argue that sublimating our fetishism is not advisable, and that embracing our ethical fetishism isn’t as obviously misguided as some suggest. (shrink)

Surprises are important in our everyday lives as well as in our scientific and philosophical theorizing—in psychology, information theory, cognitive-neuroscience, philosophy of science, and confirmation theory. Nevertheless, there is no satisfactory theory of what makes something surprising. It has long been acknowledged that not everything unexpected is surprising. The reader had no reason to expect that there will be exactly 190 words in this abstract and yet there is nothing surprising about this fact. We offer a novel theory that explains (...) when and why an unexpected fact is surprising. We distinguish between descriptive and normative notions of what is surprising; clarify the sense in which surprising facts are unexpected; and, finally, develop and defend the significance account of surprise, according to which a fact is surprising to an agent if and to the extent that it is both unexpected and significant to the agent. Since a surprising fact can be significant to an agent in various ways—personal, moral, epistemic, and aesthetic—surprise is not merely or primarily epistemic. Fitting surprise reflects more than a person’s view of what is; it reflects a person’s view of what is significant. (shrink)

Aristotle said that induction (epagōgē) is a proceeding from particulars to a universal, and the definition has been conventional ever since. But there is an ambiguity here. Induction in the Scholastic and the (so-called) Humean tradition has presumed that Aristotle meant going from particular statements to universal statements. But the alternate view, namely that Aristotle meant going from particular things to universal ideas, prevailed all through antiquity and then again from the time of Francis Bacon until the mid-nineteenth century. Recent (...) scholarship is so steeped in the first-mentioned tradition that we have virtually forgotten the other. In this essay McCaskey seeks to recover that alternate tradition, a tradition whose leading theoreticians were William Whewell, Francis Bacon, Socrates, and in fact Aristotle himself. The examination is both historical and philosophical. The first part of the essay fills out the history. The latter part examines the most mature of the philosophies in the Socratic tradition, specifically Bacon’s and Whewell’s. After tracing out this tradition, McCaskey shows how this alternate view of induction is indeed employed in science, as exemplified by several instances taken from actual scientific practice. In this manner, McCaskey proposes to us that the Humean problem of induction is merely an artifact of a bad conception of induction and that a return to the Socratic conception might be warranted. (shrink)

Motivated by examples, many philosophers believe that there is a significant distinction between states of affairs that are striking and therefore call for explanation and states of affairs that are not striking. This idea underlies several influential debates in metaphysics, philosophy of mathematics, normative theory, philosophy of modality, and philosophy of science but is not fully elaborated or explored. This paper aims to address this lack of clear explanation first by clarifying the epistemological issue at hand. Then it introduces an (...) initially attractive account for strikingness that is inspired by the work of Paul Horwich and adopted by a number of philosophers. The paper identifies two logically distinct accounts that have both been attributed to Horwich and then argues that, when properly interpreted, they can withstand former criticisms. The final two sections present a new set of considerations against both Horwichian accounts that avoid the shortcomings of former critiques. It remains to be seen whether an adequate account of strikingness exists. (shrink)

In this paper, I engage with a recent contextualist account of gender terms proposed by Díaz-León, E. 2016. “Woman as a Politically Significant Term: A Solution to the Puzzle.” Hypatia 31 : 245–58. Díaz-León’s main aim is to improve both on previous contextualist and non-contextualist views and solve a certain puzzle for feminists. Central to this task is putting forward a view that allows trans women who did not undergo gender-affirming medical procedures to use the gender terms of their choice (...) to self-identify. My goal is to investigate Díaz-León’s proposal, point out several shortcomings of the view and discuss possible replies on her part. (shrink)

Many times, what we say proves to be wrong. It might turn out that what we took to be a comforting remark was, in fact, making things worse. Or that a joke was inappropriate. Or that yelling out loud was rude. More importantly for this paper, there are plenty of cases in which what we said turns out to be false: we spoke without paying attention, we were misinformed or tricked, or we made a reasoning mistake. -/- A particular instance (...) of this latter phenomenon is when someone changes their perspective and doesn't find their previous assertions true anymore. For example, imagine that you used to like licorice as a child, and that you went around saying things like "Licorice is tasty." But, growing up, you find licorice too strong and quite boring; your tastes have changed. While the taste of licorice itself has not changed, you are not going around anymore uttering "Licorice is tasty." In fact, in certain cases, you might even think that what you said in your childhood was wrong - at least in light of your present preferences. -/- Sometimes we "take back" the assertions we made when we realize they are no longer true. Such speech acts of taking back can be performed in various ways: more formally, as effected in a court of law or when an official speaks to the press, or more informally in our day-by-day interactions. These acts of taking back are known as retraction. Retraction is usually achieved by employing certain linguistic markers ('I was wrong', 'I was mistaken', 'I retract', "Scratch that' etc.) that signal that the retractor takes their previous speech act to be faulty in a certain way. -/- This phenomenon has formed the basis for a popular argument used by relativists about a variety of natural language expressions (predicates of taste, epistemic modals, moral and aesthetic claims etc.) in support of their view. Recently, several considerations (mostly from contextualists about the same expressions), both from the armchair and based on empirical studies, have been offered to undercut the support retraction was thought to provide for relativism. In this paper, I consider and re-evaluate that support in light of both types of considerations, showing that neither of them decisively undermines it. However, to survive the contextualist counterattack, the relativist needs to pay a price: that is, she will be forced to make some concessions or rethink certain claims. I show what I think those concessions should be and what needs to be rethought (and how). The upshot is that, while the support retraction offers relativism is not as strong as initially believed, appeal to retraction remains a legitimate move in the debate. In section 1, I introduce the views in the debate and clarify the phenomenon of retraction and its dialectical role. Armchair data are investigated in section 2, proper experimental studies in section 3, while section 4 summarizes and concludes. (shrink)

Do carbon-offsetting schemes morally offset emissions? The moral equivalence thesis is the claim that the combination of emitting greenhouse gasses and offsetting those emissions is morally equivalent to not emitting at all. This thesis implies that in response to climate change, we need not make any lifestyle changes to reduce our emissions as long as we offset them. An influential argument in favor of this thesis is premised on two claims, one empirical and the other normative: (1) When you emit (...) + offset, the net result is the same as that of not emitting. (2) With emissions, the net result is what matters morally. I argue against both premises. The net result of emitting + offsetting is never equivalent to that of not emitting, and even if it were equivalent, the net result is not the only thing that matters morally. My conclusion is that although we should offset our emissions, avoiding emissions is morally preferable. This conclusion supports a stronger claim: that carbon offsets cannot relieve us of our duty to make significant lifestyle changes so as to reduce emissions and thus lesson our contribution to the harms of climate change. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to describe organizational commitment between type A personality’s and type B is personality’s workers on three companies. Organizational commitment is define as the degree of psychological identification with or attachment to the organization for which we work. Participant of this study was 108 workers from three different companies. Data was obtained by questionnaire and processed with SPSS for Windows ver. 12. Using Mann-Whitney independent t-test for non parametric, the result of organizational commitment U = (...) 1183, p > 0.05, showed that there is no difference of organizational commitment between type A personality and type B personality on company X, Y, and Z. (shrink)

“[…] only by uniting the power of the entire village could they chase Snake away.” —In “The Virtue of Sacrifice”; The Kingfisher Story Collection [1].

Crispin Wright and Filippo Ferrari have accused relativism of not accounting for “parity” – the idea that, when we argue over matters of taste, we take our opponents’ opinions to be “as good as ours” from our own, committed perspective. In this paper, I show that i) explaining parity has not been taken to be a desideratum by relativists and thus they cannot be accused of failing to fulfil a promise; ii) Wright’s and Ferrari’s reasons for claiming that parity should (...) be a desideratum are unconvincing. (shrink)

The existence of various sufferings has long been thought to pose a problem for the existence of a personal God: the Problem of Evil. In this paper, we propose an original version of POE, in which the geographic distribution of sufferings and of opportunities for flourishing or suffering is better explained if the universe, at bottom, is indifferent to the human condition than if, as theists propose, there is a personal God from whom the universe originates: the Problem of Geography. (...) POG moves beyond previous versions of POE because traditional responses to POE are less effective as responses to POG than they are to other versions of POE. (shrink)

According to the Monist Interpretation of Descartes, there is really only one corporeal substance—the entire extended plenum. Evidence for this interpretation seems to be provided by Descartes in the Synopsis of the Meditations, where he claims that all substances are incorruptible. Finite bodies, being corruptible, would then fail to be substances. On the other hand, ‘body, taken in the general sense,’ being incorruptible, would be a corporeal substance. In this paper, I defend a Pluralist Interpretation of Descartes, according to which (...) there are many corporeal substances. In particular, I show that none of the claims in the Synopsis about incorruptibility and substance entail either that finite bodies are not substances, or that the only corporeal substance is the entire plenum. (shrink)

Pria semut terkenal E.O. Wilson selalu menjadi salah satu pahlawan saya-tidak hanya seorang ahli biologi yang luar biasa, tetapi salah satu yang kecil dan menghilang minoritas intelektual yang setidaknya berani untuk petunjuk pada kebenaran tentang sifat kita bahwa orang lain gagal untuk memahami, atau sejauh yang mereka dO pegang, rajin menghindari untuk expedience politik. Sayangnya, ia mengakhiri karirnya yang panjang dalam mode yang paling mesum sebagai pihak yang bodoh dan arogan serangan terhadap sains termotivasi setidaknya sebagian oleh semangat keagamaan dari (...) rekan Harvard. Ini menunjukkan konsekuensi yang keji ketika Universitas menerima uang dari kelompok agama, jurnal Sains begitu terpesona oleh nama besar bahwa mereka menghindari review peer yang tepat, dan ketika ego diizinkan untuk keluar dari kontrol. Hal ini membawa kita ke dalam sifat evolusi, dasar dari metodologi ilmiah, bagaimana matematika berhubungan dengan ilmu pengetahuan, apa yang merupakan teori, dan bahkan apa sikap untuk agama dan kemurahan hati yang sesuai karena kita tak terelakkan pendekatan runtuhnya peradaban industri. -/- Mereka yang ingin komprehensif up to date kerangka perilaku manusia dari dua systems tampilan modern dapat berkonsultasi buku saya 'struktur Logis filsafat, psikologi, mind dan bahasa dalam Ludwig Wittgenstein dan John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Mereka yang tertarik pada tulisan saya lebih mungkin melihat 'berbicara monyet--filsafat, psikologi, ilmu, agama dan politik di planet yang ditakdirkan--artikel dan review 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) dan bunuh diri utopian delusi di 21st Century 4th Ed (2019) . (shrink)

According to cognitive psychologists, moral decision-making is a dual-process phenomenon involving two types of cognitive processes: explicit reasoning and implicit intuition. Moral development involves training and integrating both types of cognitive processes through a mix of instruction, practice, and reflection. Serious games are an ideal platform for this kind of moral training, as they provide safe spaces for exploring difficult moral problems and practicing the skills necessary to resolve them. In this article, we present Morality Play, a model for the (...) design of serious games for ethical expertise development based on the Integrative Ethical Education framework from moral psychology and the Lens of the Toy model for serious game design. (shrink)

Gerald Harrison has recently argued the evidential problem of evil can be resolved if we assume the moral facts are identical to God’s commands or favorings. On a theistic metaethics, the moral facts are identical to what God commands or favors. Our moral intuitions reflect what God commands or favors for us to do, but not what God favors for Herself to do. Thus, on Harrison’s view, while we can know the moral facts as they pertain to humans, we cannot (...) know the moral facts as they pertain to God. Therefore, Harrison argues, the evidential problem of evil inappropriately assumes God to be intuitively moral, when we have no reason to suppose a perfectly good being would match the expectations provided by our moral intuitions. Harrison calls his view a new form of skeptical theism. In response, I show Harrison’s attempt to dissolve the problem of evil exacerbates well-known skeptical consequences of skeptical theism. Harrison’s new skeptical theism leaves us with problems motivating a substantive religious life, the inability to provide a variety of theological explanations, and, despite Harrison’s comments to the contrary, worsens problems having to do with the possibility of divine deception. (shrink)

Sejak Gintis adalah ekonom senior dan saya telah membaca beberapa buku sebelumnya dengan bunga, saya mengharapkan beberapa wawasan lebih ke dalam perilaku. Sayangnya, ia membuat tangan yang mati seleksi kelompok dan fenomenologi ke dalam inti dari teori perilaku, dan ini sebagian besar membatalkan pekerjaan. Lebih buruk lagi, karena ia menunjukkan penilaian buruk seperti di sini, itu mempertanyakan semua pekerjaan sebelumnya. Upaya untuk membangkitkan kembali kelompok seleksi oleh teman-temannya di Harvard, Nowak dan Wilson, beberapa tahun yang lalu adalah salah satu skandal (...) utama dalam biologi dalam dekade terakhir, dan aku telah menceritakan kisah sedih dalam artikel ' altruisme, Yesus dan akhir dunia-bagaimana Yayasan Templeton membeli Profesor Harvard dan menyerang Evolution, rasionalitas dan peradaban--sebuah review dari E.O. Wilson ' The sosial penaklukan bumi ' (2012) dan Nowak dan Highfield ' Supercooperator ' (2012). Tidak seperti Nowak, Gintis tampaknya tidak termotivasi oleh agama fanatisme, tetapi oleh keinginan yang kuat untuk menghasilkan alternatif untuk realitas suram sifat manusia, dibuat mudah oleh (dekat Universal) kurangnya pemahaman tentang Biologi manusia dasar dan slateism kosong dari perilaku ilmuwan, akademisi lain, dan masyarakat umum. -/- Gintis benar serangan (seperti yang telah berkali-kali sebelumnya) ekonom, sosiolog dan ilmuwan perilaku lain karena tidak memiliki kerangka yang koheren untuk menggambarkan perilaku. Tentu saja, kerangka yang diperlukan untuk memahami perilaku adalah evolusi satu. Sayangnya, ia gagal untuk menyediakan satu dirinya sendiri (menurut banyak kritikus dan saya setuju), dan upaya untuk mengentalkan mayat busuk kelompok seleksi ke apa pun teori ekonomi dan psikologis ia telah menghasilkan dalam dekade kerja, hanya membatalkan seluruh proyek. -/- Meskipun Gintis membuat upaya gagah berani untuk memahami dan menjelaskan genetika, seperti Wilson dan Nowak, ia jauh dari seorang ahli, dan seperti mereka, matematika hanya membutakan dia ke ketidakmungkinan biologis dan tentu saja ini adalah norma dalam ilmu pengetahuan. Seperti yang terkenal Wittgenstein dicatat pada halaman pertama budaya dan nilai "tidak ada denominasi agama di mana penyalahgunaan ekspresi metafisik telah bertanggung jawab atas begitu banyak dosa seperti dalam matematika." -/- Itu selalu jelas bahwa gen yang menyebabkan perilaku yang menurunkan frekuensi sendiri tidak bisa bertahan, tapi ini adalah inti dari gagasan pemilihan kelompok. Selain itu, telah terkenal dan sering menunjukkan bahwa kelompok seleksi hanya mengurangi kebugaran inklusif (pilihan kerabat), yang, seperti yang telah dicatat Dawkins, hanyalah nama lain untuk evolusi oleh seleksi alam. Seperti Wilson, Gintis telah bekerja di arena ini selama sekitar 50 tahun dan masih belum menggenggam itu, tapi setelah skandal pecah, aku butuh waktu hanya 3 hari untuk menemukan, membaca dan memahami pekerjaan profesional yang paling relevan, seperti yang dijelaskan dalam artikel saya. Adalah pikiran membingungkan untuk menyadari bahwa Gintis dan Wilson tidak mampu untuk mencapai hal ini dalam hampir setengah abad. -/- Saya membahas kesalahan seleksi kelompok dan fenomenologi yang merupakan norma dalam akademisi sebagai kasus khusus dari kegagalan Universal dekat untuk memahami sifat manusia yang menghancurkan Amerika dan dunia. -/- Mereka yang ingin komprehensif up to date kerangka perilaku manusia dari dua systems tampilan modern dapat berkonsultasi buku saya 'struktur Logis filsafat, psikologi, mind dan bahasa dalam Ludwig wittgenstein dan John Searle ' 2nd Ed (2019). Mereka yang tertarik pada tulisan saya lebih mungkin melihat 'berbicara monyet--filsafat, psikologi, ilmu, agama dan politik di planet yang ditakdirkan--artikel dan review 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) dan bunuh diri utopian delusi di 21st Century 4th Ed (2019) -/- . (shrink)